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1 
<cn> 1. <ct>Debunking revisionist understandings of environmental cooperative 
federalism: collective action responses to air pollution 
 
<au>Robert L. Glicksman and Jessica A. Wentz 
 
From its inception in 1970, modern environmental law has been a joint venture between 
the federal government and the states. When Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
of 19701 it crafted the model for much of the pollution control legislation enacted in the 
ensuing decade. Commonly referred to as cooperative federalism, the model entailed 
delegating authority to a federal agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to 
enact standards and take other action to achieve clean air protection and enhancement 
goals2 and inviting states to participate in implementation, permitting, and enforcement.3 
With some variations, Congress built subsequent statutory efforts to protect water quality 
and prevent land pollution along similar lines, ‘shar[ing] governmental responsibilities for 
regulating private activity’ with the potential to create environmental harm between the 
federal government and the states.4 In the environmental context, cooperative federalism 
involves federal inducement, but not coercion of state participation in a coordinated federal 
program.5 
<em>Despite decades of experience with the CAA’s version of cooperative federalism, 
fundamental disagreements persist not only about the merits of that model, but also about 
                                               
1 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 7401–7671q). 
2 42 USC § 7401(b)(1) (declaring purpose to ‘protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources’). 
3 For a description of the basic cooperative federalism model reflected in the federal pollution control statutes, 
see Glicksman, Robert L., ‘From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of 
Environmental Law and Policy’ (2006) 41 Wake Forest L Rev 719, 719–21, 737–43. 
4 Coggins, George Cameron and Robert L. Glicksman Public Natural Resources Law vol.1, 2nd edn, 
(Thomson/West, Eagan, Minn 2007)  § 5:3. 
5 Fischman, Robert, ‘Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law’ (2006) 14 NYU Envtl LJ 179, 
184. 
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2 
what Congress intended when it delineated EPA and state roles in the 1970 Act and 
subsequent amendments. One view is that the pollution laws that Congress adopted in the 
1970s, beginning with the CAA, fundamentally changed the structure of environmental 
law by carving out ‘a significant role [for states] to play under this “cooperative” approach 
to federalism,’ while ‘clearly [making] EPA the senior partner in the relationship. The 
states had lost their predominant position’.6 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
expressed a similar understanding, summarizing the CAA model as one in which states are 
responsible for adopting plans to implement EPA’s national ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS), but ‘with federal oversight.’7  
<em>Some judicial decisions provide a significantly different depiction of the roles of 
federal and state regulators under the CAA. The most prominent such decision is Justice 
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v 
EPA,8 in which the Supreme Court held that the CAA authorizes substantive review by 
EPA of state permitting decisions for stationary sources in prevention of significant 
deterioration (PSD) areas. Justice Kennedy responded to EPA’s contention that such 
review helps prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in which states lower environmental standards 
to attract industry by finding ‘EPA’s distrust of state agencies’ to be ‘inconsistent with the 
Act’s clear mandate that States bear the primary role in controlling pollution.’9 According 
to Kennedy, ‘Congress made the overriding judgment that States are more responsive to 
                                               
6 Andreen, William L. ‘Of Fables and Federalism: A Re-Examination of the Historical Rationale for Federal 
Environmental Regulation’ (2012) 42 Envtl. L. 627, 629. 
7 Oklahoma v EPA 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). 
8 540 US 461 (2004). 
9 Ibid. at 506–07. 
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3 
local conditions and can strike the right balance between preserving environmental quality 
and advancing competing objectives.’10 He protested EPA’s lack of trust in the states and 
charged that vesting in EPA veto power over state PSD permits violated ‘the established 
presumption that States act in good faith.’11 Justice Kennedy was also dismayed by the 
‘broader implications’ of the Court’s decision: 
 
<quotation>The CAA is not the only statute that relies on a close and equal partnership 
between federal and state authorities to accomplish congressional objectives. Under the 
majority’s reasoning, these other statutes, too, could be said to confer on federal agencies 
ultimate decision-making authority, relegating States to the role of mere provinces or 
political corporations, instead of coequal sovereigns entitled to the same dignity and 
respect. If cooperative federalism is to achieve Congress’ goal of allowing state 
governments to be accountable to the democratic process in implementing environmental 
policies, federal agencies cannot consign States to the ministerial tasks of information 
gathering and making initial recommendations, while reserving to themselves the authority 
to make final judgments under the guise of surveillance and oversight.12</quotation> 
 
<em>Echoing Justice Kennedy’s dissent, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently 
interpreted the CAA as ‘confin[ing] the EPA to the ministerial function of reviewing [state 
                                               
10 Ibid. at 507. 
11 Ibid. He also asserted that even EPA agreed that ‘States, by and large, take their statutory responsibility 
seriously,’ and that EPA itself had admitted that its ‘fears about a race to the bottom bear little relation to the 
real-world experience under the statute’. Ibid. 
12 Ibid. at 518 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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implementation plans] for consistency with the Act’s requirements,’ reasoning that this 
narrow reading of EPA’s authority ‘reflects the balance of state and federal rights and 
responsibilities characteristic of our federal system of government.’13 Similarly, a minority 
report issued by the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works in 2013 
expressed concern that ‘EPA, instead of cooperating with the States as equal and valued 
partners, is coopting and coercing the States by treating them as mere regional offices of a 
massive federal environmental bureaucracy.’14 
<em>Thus, despite decades of experience with the CAA, courts and commentators offer 
dramatically different descriptions of its cooperative federalism enterprise. Either the 
statute makes EPA the dominant partner, and the opportunity afforded to the states to 
participate in fashioning air pollution control policy, albeit significant, ‘is the power of the 
servant, not the sovereign,’15 or Congress intended to make EPA and the states equal 
partners.16 
<em>This chapter demonstrates that the vision of CAA cooperative federalism as an equal 
partnership bears no resemblance to the allocation of power Congress established in 
adopting the CAA. Congress made EPA the dominant partner because experience 
convinced it that the states lacked the will or the capacity to achieve its air quality 
                                               
13 Luminant Generation Co., LLC v EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 921 (5th Cir. 2012). See also Luminant Generation 
Co., LLC v EPA, 714 F.3d 841, 846 (5th Cir. 2013). 
14 US Senate, Comm. on Environment and Public Works, Minority Report, Cooperative Federalism, 
Neglecting a Cornerstone Principle of the Clean Air Act: President Obama’s EPA Leaves States Behind 13 
(31 October 2013) (hereinafter Cooperative Federalism). The report also postulated that ‘mere inadequacy 
of a [state implementation plan] in the eyes of EPA is not a sufficient basis for disapproving’ the plan. Ibid. 
at 17. 
15 Gerken, Heather K. ‘The Federalis(m) Society’ (2013) 36 Harv JL & Pub Pol’y 1, 3. 
16 In limited contexts under other pollution control statutes, Congress has given the states the power to 
override federal actions. See Carlson, Ann E., ‘Reverse Preemption’ (2013) 40 Ecology LQ 583. 
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protection goals. While it recognized that states’ familiarity with local conditions made a 
significant state role in deciding how to implement some federal standards desirable, it also 
acted on the premise that a series of collective action problems could be effectively 
addressed only by vesting predominant policymaking authority in a federal agency. 
Experience in implementing the 1970 CAA reinforced these sentiments, inducing Congress 
to tilt the balance of power even more heavily toward EPA in the 1977 and 1990 
amendments. Congress allowed the states to avoid federal supervision or constraints only 
when they adopt emission controls more stringent than the floors established by EPA 
(except in limited areas such as emission controls for new motor vehicles). This approach 
does not disrespect state sovereignty. As the Supreme Court recognized in a 1981 decision 
upholding a statute regulating surface mining, this cooperative federalism approach is less 
intrusive than the complete preemption of state authority to regulate activities creating 
environmental harms with interstate effects to which Congress could have resorted.17 
<em>This chapter emphasizes the predominant role of EPA vis-à-vis the states in various 
CAA programs. It refutes recent characterizations of its cooperative federalism design as 
intended to create an ‘equal partnership’ between EPA and the states. Instead, the 
legislative history reveals that Congress crafted key statutory programs to address 
collective action problems that it regarded the states as incapable of solving. Finally, the 
chapter briefly examines the desirability of this cooperative federalism model both in 
controlling conventional air pollution and in seeking to address greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
that contribute to climate disruption. The authors find that the CAA’s delegation to EPA 
                                               
17 Hodel v Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 US 264, 289–91 (1981). 
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of the dominant role in controlling conventional air pollution, subject to state power to 
exceed federal minimums, has largely succeeded in addressing conventional air pollution 
problems. Moreover, this version of cooperative federalism promises to be an effective 
approach for regulating GHG emissions. Unfortunately, judicial decisions circumscribing 
EPA’s authority under the CAA have undermined federal efforts to address lingering 
collective action problems such as interstate air pollution. An accurate application of the 
cooperative federalism model actually established under the CAA is imperative for the 
successful implementation and enforcement of the statute’s programs and goals. 
 
<A>The CAA makes EPA the dominant cooperative federalism partner 
 
That Congress sought to protect and enhance air quality through a cooperative federalism 
venture is not in dispute. The CAA finds that ‘Federal financial assistance and leadership 
is essential for the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs 
to prevent and control air pollution.’18 Congress committed the federal government to 
provide technical and financial assistance to state and local governments to help them 
develop and implement air pollution control programs.19 EPA must encourage cooperative 
activities by state and local governments and improved laws to control air pollution, in 
pursuit of uniformity to the extent it is practicable ‘in the light of varying conditions and 
                                               
18 42 USC § 7401(a)(4). 
19 Ibid. at § 7401(b)(3). 
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needs.’20 EPA may make grants to support regional, state, and local programs.21 None of 
these provisions, however, establishes the states as equal partners with EPA. 
<em>The Act declares air pollution control at its source to be ‘the primary responsibility 
of States and local governments.’22Morevover, as indicated below, authorizes EPA to step 
in if the states do not fulfill that responsibility. Notably, the statute refers to state 
responsibilities, not rights. Responsibilities imply duties, whose breach carries 
consequences. The reference to responsibilities contrasts with the Clean Water Act’s 
enunciation of a federal policy of recognizing, preserving, and protecting ‘the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,’23 and with 
the same law’s renunciation of any intent to supersede, abrogate, or impair state authority 
to allocate quantities of water within a state’s jurisdiction.24 When the CAA refers to states’ 
‘rights,’ it preserves their right, with exceptions for mobile source controls, to enact 
standards more stringent than applicable federal rules.25 States are therefore free to craft 
air pollution control policy without EPA supervision only when they choose to exceed 
federal minimum standards. 
<em>The CAA’s allocation of authority between EPA and the states is usually clear-cut. 
EPA is responsible for adopting the NAAQS that form the Act’s central pollution control 
mechanism, although it may seek technical input from state and local governments, among 
                                               
20 Ibid. at § 7402(a). 
21 Ibid. at § 7405. 
22 Id. at § 7401(a)(3). 
23 33 USC § 1251(b) (emphasis added). 
24 Ibid. at § 1251(g). 
25 42 USC § 7416. 
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others.26 Each state has ‘the primary responsibility for assuring air quality’ within its 
borders by adopting a state implementation plan (SIP) for each NAAQS.27 States must 
submit each SIP to EPA to determine whether it meets mandatory requirements.28 EPA 
must approve a SIP that meets these requirements;29 the Supreme Court in an early CAA 
case concluded that EPA has ‘no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of 
emissions limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies [the Act’s minimum 
requirements]. Thus, so long as the ultimate effects of a State’s choices of emissions 
limitations is compliance with the [NAAQS], the state is at liberty to adopt whatever mix 
of emission limitations it deems best suited to its particular situation.’30 Nevertheless, 
Congress specified the mandatory components of each state plan, delegated to EPA the 
power to assess whether a plan meets those requirements, and authorized EPA to adopt a 
federal implementation plan if a state fails to abide by its responsibilities.31 Likewise, the 
statute gives the states the first opportunity to enforce SIP provisions or permits, but allows 
EPA to enforce if the states do not.32 
<em>Other CAA programs provide less authority to the states, or none at all. Whereas the 
states are responsible in the first instance for developing and imposing controls on sources 
that emit pollutants covered by the NAAQS, Congress gave EPA the power to issue 
                                               
26 Ibid. at § 7408(a)–(b). 
27 Ibid. at § 7407(a). 
28 Ibid. at § 7410(a)(1)–(2). Each SIP must include, among other things, enforceable emissions limitations 
and other control measures, schedules and timetables for compliance, monitoring requirements, enforcement 
provisions, and measures to prevent interstate pollution. Ibid. at § 7410(a)(2).  
29 Ibid. at § 7410(k)(3). 
30 Train v Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 US 60, 79 (1975). See also ibid. at 86–87 (stating that Congress 
‘left to the state considerable latitude in determining specifically how the [NAAQS] would be met. This 
discretion includes the continuing authority to revise choices about the mix of emissions limitations.’). 
31 42 USC § 7410(c). 
32 Ibid. at § 7413(a). 
Commented [RG1]: Is this quote long enough to be put in a 
block quote? 
  
 
9 
technology-based emission standards for new stationary sources33 and newly manufactured 
mobile sources,34 and to issue technology-based and, if necessary, health-based standards 
for hazardous air pollutants.35 States may adopt and submit for EPA approval a program to 
implement and enforce emission standards for hazardous air pollutants to displace the 
federal program, but state standards may not be less stringent than EPA’s standards.36 EPA 
is responsible for enforcing all of these federal emission standards.37 
<em>States may adopt controls more stringent than EPA’s standards for new sources or 
sources of hazardous air pollutants, but the statute completely preempts state power to 
adopt tailpipe emission standards for new motor vehicles.38 EPA may waive this 
prohibition by allowing California to adopt more stringent standards,39 and, if it does so, 
any other state may adopt California’s standards in lieu of EPA’s.40 
<em>EPA is also largely responsible for implementing the programs added in the 1990 
amendments to control acid deposition41 and emissions of substances that deplete the 
stratospheric ozone layer.42 The 1990 amendments also authorized states to seek EPA 
                                               
33 Ibid. at § 7411. EPA may require states to submit plans establishing standards of performance for existing 
sources in industrial categories covered by the new source standards of performance issued under § 111. EPA 
retains backup regulatory authority, with the discretion to issue a plan for a state failing to submit a 
satisfactory one. Ibid. at § 7411(d). 
34 Ibid. at §§ 7521, 7547, 7571. 
35 Ibid. at § 7412.  
36 Ibid. at § 7412(l). 
37 Ibid. at §§ 7413(a)(3), (b)–(c), 7523–4. 
38 Ibid. at § 7543(a). 
39 Ibid. at § 7543(b). 
40 Ibid. at § 7507. Congress included this waiver procedure in the 1970 CAA because it recognized that 
California regulators might need to impose more stringent tailpipe emissions standards to address the state’s 
uniquely severe pollution problems and to enable California to meet the NAAQS. See 116 Cong. Rec. 
19,231–37 (1970). Air quality in Los Angeles, for example, was five times worse than in any other city in 
the country. Ibid. at 19,237 (remarks of Rep. Springer). 
41 42 USC §§ 7651–51o. 
42 Ibid. at §§ 7671–7671q. 
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approval of permit programs that encompass all aspects of the CAA’s emission controls 
for stationary sources, but the statute prescribes the mandatory minimum contents of state 
program and authorizes EPA to determine whether a state program is adequate. State-
issued permits must incorporate all controls applicable to the source covered by the permit, 
including those issued solely by EPA.43 EPA may reject a state’s proposed permit and if 
the state does not make changes identified by EPA, EPA may deny or issue the permit 
itself.44 EPA also may revoke a state permit program if it determines that the state is not 
adequately administering and enforcing the program.45 Thus, with the exception of state 
power to adopt controls more stringent than federal standards for stationary sources, EPA 
either unilaterally adopts pollution control standards or determines whether state provisions 
meet state responsibilities. It is difficult to conceptualize the states as equal partners with 
EPA under virtually any aspect of the statutory program (other than the power to adopt 
controls more stringent than EPA’s), no less under the statute as a whole. 
 
<A>Collective action rationales for federal environmental regulation 
 
A significant federal role in environmental lawmaking requires justification, given the 
traditional state role in protecting health and safety through exercise of the police power, 
and the preference for policymaking by state and local officials in light of their superior 
political accountability and familiarity with local conditions. Collective action theory 
                                               
43 Ibid. at §§ 7661a, 7661c(a). 
44 Ibid. at § 7661d(b)–(c). 
45 Ibid. at § 7661a(i). 
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justifies environmental laws such as the CAA that carve out a predominant role for the 
federal government. That theory examines the dynamics of individual behavior in 
cooperative group settings.46 Much of environmental regulation generally can be explained 
as an effort to avert the tragedy of the commons, which is a collective action problem that 
causes shared resources to be overused.47 Five more specific collective action problems 
justify significant federal authority to adopt and implement environmental law instead of 
leaving such matters within state control: transboundary externalities, the benefits of 
resource pooling, avoidance of a race to the bottom, the need for uniformity, and avoidance 
of the ‘not in my backyard’ syndrome.48 With the exception of the last one, Congress relied 
on all of these collective action problems in authorizing EPA to adopt and implement air 
pollution controls itself or to supervise state implementation and displace the authority of 
underperforming states. 
<B>Transboundary Externalities 
One of the clearest justifications for federal intervention is the fact that air pollution can 
create negative externalities in states downwind from the pollution source.49 The core 
concern is that a state enjoying the economic benefits of the activity producing interstate 
air pollution without having to address adverse environmental impacts will abstain from 
regulation. Federal intervention is justified because the source state has no incentive to 
                                               
46 Glicksman, Robert L. and Richard E. Levy,  ‘A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by 
Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change’ (2008) 102 Nw U.L. Rev. 579, 579 
n.1. See generally Olson, Mancur The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Group 
(Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1965). 
47 Glicksman and Levy, supra n.46, p. 593. 
48 See ibid., pp. 593–602. 
49 See Merrill, Thomas W., ‘Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution’ (1997) 46 Duke L.J. 931; Revesz, 
Richard L., ‘Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities’ (1996) 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2341. 
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regulate in-state sources that pollute downwind states and downwind states have no 
authority to regulate those sources.  
<B>Resource Pooling  
The federal government can pool resources from across the country to develop and 
implement regulatory programs, giving it more resources than any individual state has to 
collect technical information, conduct scientific studies, and develop and enforce 
standards. In some instances, the federal government can carry out these activities more 
efficiently than could multiple states acting independently. 
<B>Race to the Bottom  
Concerns about a ‘race to the bottom’ among states may justify federal regulation. If states 
have different environmental standards, regulated industries may migrate from 
jurisdictions with more stringent standards to those with less stringent standards. This 
dynamic creates a perverse incentive for each state to relax its environmental standards to 
gain the economic benefits and tax revenues that polluting businesses provide. Interstate 
competition for industry can lead all states to settle on a lowest common denominator of 
environmental degradation. States imposing stringent standards are penalized.50 Federal 
regulation can halt the race by establishing a floor below which the states may not go. 
<B>Uniform Standards  
                                               
50 See Engel, Kirsten, ‘State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a ‘Race’ and Is It ‘to the Bottom’? 
(1997) 48 Hastings LJ 271; Esty, Daniel C., ‘Revitalizing Environmental Federalism’ (1996) 95 Mich. L. 
Rev. 570; Swire, Peter P., ‘The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in 
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law’ (1996) 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 67. 
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Exclusive federal regulation provides uniform standards. The key advantage of uniform 
regulation is that it reduces production and transaction costs for regulated entities supplying 
goods and services in interstate commerce, such as manufacturers of new vehicles.51 
Uniform standards avoid the need for industries whose products have a national market to 
comply with multiple, divergent state standards. Although states are free to harmonize their 
standards, it is typically easier to achieve uniformity through the imposition of exclusive 
federal standards. 
<B>The ‘Not In My Backyard’ (NIMBY) Syndrome 
Local opposition to the siting of undesirable (but sometimes necessary) land uses can 
prompt strict state or local laws that seek to drive those activities elsewhere. If all 
jurisdictions adopt such laws, socially important activities that necessarily generate adverse 
environmental effects may be permitted nowhere. NIMBYism is the inverse of the negative 
externality problem in that the host state bears all or most of the associated environmental 
burdens, while the economic benefits are more broadly distributed among the states. 
Although this phenomenon may present a compelling rationale for federal regulation in 
contexts such as waste disposal,52 it is not the basis for federal air pollution control. 
 
<A>Congress relied on collective action rationales to make EPA the dominant CAA 
partner 
 
                                               
51 See Engel, supra n.50, at 369. 
52 See Glicksman and Levy, supra n.46, at 600–01 (discussing the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
of 1980). 
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Until the mid-twentieth century, air pollution control was the domain of state and local 
governments. Worsening pollution, growing awareness of its public health consequences, 
and the perceived failure of states and localities to adequately address pollution combined 
to generate public demand and congressional support for a dramatic shift in the direction 
of greater federal power. When Congress passed the 1970 CAA, it chose to vest in the 
newly created EPA the dominant role in pursuing statutory goals. In doing so, it subscribed 
to the belief that collective actions problems made federal dominance essential for effective 
air pollution control. Amendments adopted in 1977 and 1990 reinforced the states’ 
subsidiary role, either because states had not responded adequately to past responsibilities 
under the Act or because collective action problems made it unlikely that they would be 
able to manage newly discovered problems. 
<B>The 1970 Act  
When Congress adopted legislation during the 1960s to protect the public health from air 
pollution, it carved out a relatively limited role for the federal government. Aside from 
taking the lead in controlling interstate air pollution and regulating new motor vehicle 
emissions, federal agencies would primarily set goals and provide financial and technical 
assistance to state regulators. According to Senator Edmund Muskie, a principal author of 
the 1970 Act, Congress established a strong regulatory role for the states because it wanted 
‘to preserve the federal system’ and ‘recognized that the task of implementing and 
enforcing the clean air program was so enormous that it would be helpful to have effective 
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agencies at the state and local level to get the job done more quickly and thoroughly.’53 By 
1970, however, a House committee report characterized progress under the pre-1970 
legislation as inadequate and emphasized the urgency of more expeditious control of 
sources and more effective enforcement.54 The states would continue to participate 
significantly in pollution control efforts primarily for practical reasons; the federal 
government lacked the resources to implement the statute by itself and the states and 
localities were best situated to implement land use and transportation control policies 
thought to be critical to effective pollution control.55 
<em>Congress passed the 1970 Act with near unanimity, and yet ‘[f]ew members of 
Congress… expressed any sentiments for the abstract values of state autonomy’. Indeed, 
‘federal legislators viewed state autonomy with suspicion because the states had failed to 
impose adequate air pollution controls’ when they had the opportunity to do so under the 
pre-1970 legislation.56 Sentiments in favor of state autonomy related principally to state 
authority to adopt more stringent motor vehicle emission standards than EPA’s. Some 
legislators referred to the states’ ‘right to have higher standards.’57 Congress eventually 
decided to allow California alone to adopt more stringent tailpipe emission standards, but 
permitted other states to adopt California’s standards.58 
                                               
53 Muskie, Edmund S., ‘Role of the Federal Government in Air Pollution Control’ (1968–1969) 10 Ariz L 
Rev 17, 17. 
54 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, pp. 1, 5 (1970). See also Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v EPA, 540 US 461, 
469 (2004) (describing the 1970 Act as the outgrowth of ‘dissatisfaction with the progress of existing air 
pollution programs’). 
55 See e.g. S. Rep. No. 1196, p. 2 (1970). 
56 Dwyer, John P., ‘The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act’ (1995) 54 Md L. Rev. 1183, 1192–
93. 
57 See e.g. 116 Cong Rec 19, 231 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Saylor). 
58 42 USC §§ 7407, 7543. 
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<em>Some policymakers were concerned about protecting rights, but they focused on 
individual rights to a healthy environment and the need to protect states that took their 
environmental protection responsibilities seriously. A 1970 Senate report justified vesting 
in EPA authority to adopt NAAQS by asserting that ‘the air is a public resource, and…  
those who use that resource must protect it from abuse, to assure the protection of the health 
of every American.’59 Similarly, President Nixon supported the NAAQS program because 
it would ‘provide a minimum standard for air quality for all areas of the nation, while 
permitting States to set more stringent standards.’60 Legislators also feared a race to the 
bottom, notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s contrary protestations. As one House member 
put it, ‘if we do not have [NAAQS], we find what has happened is that States begin to bid 
against each other to attract polluting industries . . . So I say it is not fair to those States 
who are trying to do something about pollution to allow such lowering of standards to 
attract polluting industries into other States.’61 Similarly, Nixon noted that the NAAQS 
would protect the interests of industries subject to stringent state controls, which ‘would 
otherwise be disadvantaged with respect to competitors’ subject to less rigorous controls.62 
Uniform NAAQS would level the playing field. 
<em>The 1970 Act vested responsibility to implement the NAAQS in the states, which 
could craft pollution control strategies suitable to their social and economic needs. But, as 
one legislator put it, ‘[i]f a State hangs back and fails to move out, the Federal government 
                                               
59 S. Rep. No. 91-1996, at 4 (1970). 
60 President Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Environmental Quality (10 February 
1970) (transcript accessed 28 June 2015 at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2757). 
61 116 Cong. Rec. 19,213 (remarks of Rep. Preyer). 
62 Nixon, supra n.60. 
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will take over and make rules and regulations amounting to a State plan.’63 Thus, although 
Congress afforded the states the opportunity to choose their own paths for meeting the 
NAAQS, it hardly made the states equal partners with EPA. Rather, as the Supreme Court 
put it, Congress reacted to disaffection with pre-1970 state progress by ‘taking a stick to 
the States in the form of the [1970 Act],’ which ‘sharply increased federal authority and 
responsibility in the continuing effort to combat air pollution.’64 For the first time, the states 
had to attain air quality of specified standards on a federally specified timetable. 
Notwithstanding Justice Kennedy’s later characterization, congressional distrust of state 
performance also provided the rationale for jointly authorizing EPA and the states to 
enforce SIP provisions, and for providing a safety net in the form of citizen suit 
enforcement.65 
<em>Congress cited several collective action rationales for increasing the federal role in 
air pollution control. First, it relied on race-to-the-bottom concerns to justify delegating to 
EPA the power to adopt nationally uniform emissions standards for new sources and 
hazardous air pollutants. According to a House report, both sets of standards would 
‘preclude efforts on the part of states to compete with each other in trying to attract new 
plants and facilities without assuring adequate control of extra-hazardous or large-scale 
emissions therefrom.’66 Second, legislators cited superior federal expertise and resources 
                                               
63 116 Cong. Rec. 19,206 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Springer). 
64 Train v Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 US 60, 64–65 (1970). Cf. Union Elec. Co. v EPA, 427 US 
246, 249, 256–57 (1976) (repeating the stick metaphor and noting that although the CAA gave states the 
primary responsibility to formulate control strategies, it subjected them to ‘strict minimum compliance 
requirements’ of a technology-forcing character). 
65 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 21 (1970). 
66 H.R. Rep. No. 91-1146, at 2 (1970). See also S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 49 (1970) (seeking to prevent states 
with adequate controls from being placed at a competitive disadvantage). 
  
 
18 
(the resource pooling rationale for federal action) to support uniform federal standards.67 
Third, Congress decided to delegate to EPA exclusive power to adopt tailpipe emissions 
standards (with an exception for California) to address the need for uniformity. A Senate 
report accompanying earlier air pollution legislation stated that ‘it would be more desirable 
to have national standards rather than for each State to have a variation in standards and 
requirements which could result in chaos insofar as manufacturers, dealers, and users are 
concerned.’68 Senator Muskie later explained that restricting state authority in this manner 
was appropriate because it was ‘obviously in the public interest to reduce the variation in 
automotive emissions standards to an absolute minimum.’69 Congress accommodated state 
interests primarily by authorizing the states to adopt controls (except for new motor 
vehicles) more stringent than EPA’s.70 
<B>The 1977 Amendments 
The 1977 amendments extended the deadlines for compliance with the NAAQS due to 
many states’ failure to meet the original statutory timetable. They also added new 
programs, including permitting requirements for major stationary sources in both air 
quality control regions that had not yet met the NAAQS (nonattainment areas) and regions 
with air quality better than required by the NAAQS (PSD areas). Although some 
lawmakers expressed concerns about rising regulatory costs and increasing federal 
intrusion on state prerogatives, the dominant theme expounded throughout the legislative 
                                               
67 See e.g. 116 Cong. Rec. 19,206 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Springer). 
68 S. Rep. No. 89-192, at 6 (1965). 
69 Muskie, supra n.53, at 20. As indicated above, Congress allowed California to seek permission to enact 
more stringent standards because of its early efforts to control auto pollution and the severity of the state’s 
pollution problems. 
70 See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, at 15 (1970) (explaining the purpose of § 116 of the 1970 Act). 
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debate was the need for an even stronger federal role vis-à-vis the states. Legislators again 
invoked the specter of a race to the bottom, identifying as a key purpose of the amendments 
the prevention of industry’s ability to foster competition for new business through the 
adoption of ever weaker state controls.71 A House report referred to this practice as 
‘environmental blackmail.’72 The non-attainment provisions subjected states failing to 
meet NAAQS deadlines to new penalties and required them to submit SIP revisions.73 The 
amendments reduced state discretion to determine the appropriate mix of emissions 
controls needed to achieve the NAAQS by, among other things, requiring states with non-
attainment areas to ensure that existing stationary sources in those areas implement 
reasonably available control measures for the non-attainment pollutants74 and to ensure 
that new and majorly modified sources install emissions controls reflecting the lowest 
achievable emissions rate for those pollutants.75 
<em>Opponents of the new PSD provisions complained about unfair discrimination 
against the economic interests of states with clean air resources and protested the 
unwarranted federal intrusion on local governments’ ability ‘to protect clean air from 
people.’76 The House committee report, however, actually lists the ‘protection of States’ 
rights’ as a key justification for the PSD program.77 The Act delegated to the states ‘primary 
                                               
71 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 11 (1970), 133–35 (1977). See also Dwyer, supra n.56, at 1195 (‘Because of 
their willingness to relax environmental standards to attract or keep economic development, states could not 
be trusted to adopt adequate standards.’). 
72 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 195. 
73 The amended sanction provisions are at 42 USC § 7509. 
74 42 USC § 7502(c)(1). 
75 Ibid. at §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503(a)(2), 7501(3). 
76 See e.g. 123 Cong. Rec. 18,135 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Garn). Some even charged that the PSD program 
amounted to a federal land use control system. See e.g. ibid. at 16,964 (remarks of Rep. Rousselot). 
77 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 105 (1977). Specifically, the PSD program was intended to protect states’ rights 
to be free of interstate air pollution and to avoid the practice of ‘environmental blackmail’ described above. 
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responsibility’ for administering the program, but required that they abide by minimum 
standards (measured as percentages of the NAAQS) regarded as ‘essential to guarantee the 
individual States the right to decide to maintain air quality superior to minimum federal 
standards.’78 Indeed, a House report asserted that without the PSD provisions, the pre-
existing guarantee that states would retain the power to adopt standards more stringent than 
EPA’s would be meaningless.79 The same report also noted that the PSD program would 
help avoid the race to the bottom by precluding sources from ‘shopping around’ for 
locations with clean air and weak controls.80 
<em>Congress had authorized federal regulation of interstate pollution even before 1970 
as a necessary response to transboundary externalities.81 The 1977 amendments sought to 
facilitate EPA efforts to enforce statutory restrictions on interstate pollution and authorized 
states to petition EPA for a finding that an upwind state was violating the statute by 
inadequately restricting emissions that prevented attainment or maintenance of the 
NAAQS in the petitioning state.82 The goal was to protect downwind states’ interests by 
‘making a source at least as responsible for polluting another State as it would be for 
polluting its own State,’ even if the source state’s SIP did not prevent it from doing so.83 
<B>The 1990 Amendments 
                                               
78 Ibid. at 136. The Supreme Court described EPA’s authority to issue orders halting construction of major 
facilities permitted by states notwithstanding regulatory deficiencies as ‘notably capacious.’ Alaska Dep’t of 
Envtl. Conservation v EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 473–74 (2004). Another court later rejected the contention that 
EPA’s implementation of the CAA’s related visibility protection provisions ‘trample[d] on discretion that 
Congress afforded states,’ noting that the exercise of state responsibility is subject to federal oversight. 
Oklahoma v EPA, 723 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). 
79 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 136–37 (1977). 
80 Ibid., at 133. 
81 See Glicksman and Levy, supra n.46, at 594–95. 
82 42 USC § 7426. 
83 S. Rep. No. 95-127, at 40 (1977). 
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The 1977 amendments tilted the balance of federal-state authority significantly toward 
greater EPA control, protecting state autonomy mainly by reinforcing states’ freedom to 
adopt controls more stringent than EPA’s and by constraining the power of one state to 
prevent another from effectively doing so. The 1990 amendments took another step away 
from a regime even remotely resembling an ‘equal partnership’ between the two levels of 
government. The amendments were spurred by the persistent failure of some states to 
comply with the NAAQS and by the need to address newly discovered or inadequately 
addressed problems such as acid deposition and stratospheric ozone depletion. The 
amendments set new deadlines for NAAQS compliance in nonattainment areas, defined in 
much greater detail the steps necessary to move states with nonattainment areas toward 
compliance (and refined the sanctions available if states did not do so84), established a cap-
and-trade program for coal-fired power plants that emitted acid rain precursors, stiffened 
interstate controls still further,85 phased out the manufacture and use of ozone-depleting 
chemicals to comply with US treaty commitments under the Montreal Protocol, and 
established a new permit program to help consolidate in one document all regulatory 
requirements applicable to a source. 
<em>Individual legislators predicted economic disruption. Senator Minority Leader Bob 
Dole called the bill ‘the toughest environmental medicine America has ever had to take,’ 
but supported it anyway.86 Other legislators protested the burdens the legislation would 
                                               
84 42 USC § 7410(m). 
85 See e.g. GenOn REMA, LLC v EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 2013) (‘Congress viewed the Federal 
government as continuing to play an essential role in the fight against interstate pollution despite the fact that 
the states are the primary actors for implementing NAAQS and formulating SIPs.’). 
86 136 Cong. Rec. 36, 130 (1990). 
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impose on some regions, such as those producing or whose sources burned large amounts 
of high-sulfur coal.87 Congress adopted the amendments in the face of this opposition. 
Senator Bentsen’s response to those who opposed the acid rain provisions was that 
‘fairness’ considerations had to be supplemented by state responsibility for the downwind 
harms caused by their sources, consistent with the ‘polluter pays’ principle.88 A House 
report noted that the amendments signaled that Congress was ‘very serious’ about air 
pollution control and ‘will require all States to comply fully’ with their CAA duties. States 
not making good faith efforts to comply would be severely sanctioned.89 The ‘stick’ 
Congress wielded in 1970 got larger in 1977 and larger still in 1990, notwithstanding 
preservation of the CAA’s basic cooperative federalism architecture. 
 
<A>The performance of cooperative federalism under the CAA 
 
Congress’s initial venture into environmental cooperative federalism is largely a success 
story. A 2013 minority report of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 
while highly critical of the Obama administration’s implementation of the CAA, concluded 
that ‘[a]ir quality has significantly improved in the United States over the past 40 years, 
and the [CAA’s] cooperative federalism arrangement deserves credit.’90 Both emissions 
and ambient concentrations of the criteria pollutants covered by the NAAQS – the 
                                               
87 See e.g. ibid., at 35,007 (remarks of Rep. Luken); ibid., at 35,016 (remarks of Rep. Applegate). 
88 Ibid., at 36,129. 
89 H.R. Rep. No. 101-490 (1990). 
90 Cooperative Federalism, supra n.14, at 11. The criticism was directed at EPA’s alleged treatment of states 
not as ‘equal and valued partners,’ but as objects of cooptation and coercion, and as ‘mere regional offices 
of a massive federal environmental bureaucracy’. Ibid., at 13. 
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centerpiece of the statute and the primary focus of public health concern – have fallen 
significantly on a national basis, notwithstanding economic growth and population 
increases.91 Some programs administered by EPA without significant state assistance also 
have fared well. The acid deposition control’s cap-and-trade program, for example, has 
reduced emissions of acid rain precursors generated by fossil fuel combustion at lower 
costs than anticipated.92 The statutory phaseout of ozone-depleting chemicals has helped 
shrink the hole in the ozone layer that increases risks for skin cancer and cataracts, although 
the hole is not expected to fully close before 2070.93 Retained state authority to adopt more 
stringent state controls has borne fruit in the form of ambitious state programs which have 
gone further than federal controls (such as California’s control of motor vehicle emissions) 
or preceded such controls (such as California’s restrictions on GHG emissions). In some 
instances, one state’s programs have spurred efforts by other states or EPA.94 Indeed, 
                                               
91 See Glicksman, Robert L. et al., Environmental Protection: Law and Policy, 7th edn, (Wolters Kluwer, 
Austin, Boston, Chicago, New York, the Netherlands (2015), pp. 428–30. David Adelman, however, 
attributes most of the reduction in criteria pollutants to direct federal regulation, not the NAQQS program. 
See Adelman, David, ‘Environmental Federalism: When Numbers Matter More than Size’ (2014) 32 UCLA 
J. Envt’l L. & Pol’y 238, 301–04.  
92 See e.g. Glicksman et al., supra n.91, pp. 586–88; Goffman, Joseph ‘Title IV of the Clean Air Act: Lessons 
for Success of the Acid Rain Emissions Trading Program’ (2006) 14 Penn. St. Envtl L. Rev. 177, 179–80.  
93 See Culaba, Anne (January 2014) ‘Good News: Ozone Hole Closing. Bad News: It Won’t Recover Until 
2070’, RYOT News, accessed 30 June 2015 at www.ryot.org/full-recovery-ozone-layer-wont-happen-
2070/499477. See also Driesen, David M. and Amy Sinden, ‘The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits’ 
(2009) 33 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. 65, 85 (‘Scholars recognize the phaseout of ozone-depleting chemicals as the 
major (some say the only) example of successful international environmental protection.’).  
94 See e.g. Pawa, Matthew F., ‘The Very Definition of Folly: Saving the Earth from Environmentalists’ (2011) 
38 BC Envtl Aff. L. Rev. 77, 80–81 (describing adoption by a dozen states of California’s vehicle emission 
standards); Buzbee, William W., ‘Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and the Quest for 
Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity’ (2009) 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1521, 1551–52 (describing other 
states’ desire to adopt California emissions standards for GHGs). See also Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 
v Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 2014) (Gould J, concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that 
‘once states appreciate the benefits of [California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard], there may be a cascade of 
similar laws throughout the country – and perhaps federal action –aimed at stemming the tide of global 
warming’). 
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adoption of stringent state standards by a jurisdiction (like California) with a large market 
share for a regulated product such as new cars may induce manufacturers to conform their 
products globally to the standard to increase economies of scale, even in the absence of 
copycat regulation by other jurisdictions.95  
<em>The CAA is not an unalloyed cooperative federalism success story, however. 
Nonattainment persists, especially in major urban areas. Decades after Congress first 
mandated compliance with the NAAQS, more than forty percent of US residents (more 
than 131 million people) live in counties with unhealthy levels of either ozone or particulate 
matter.96 Persistent nonattainment problems are due principally to emissions from mobile 
and small stationary sources (such as gas stations, paint emissions, and agricultural field 
burning), not from large industrial sources (with the exception of fossil fuel-fired electric 
power plants).97 Because the states are primarily responsible for regulating emissions from 
smaller sources under their SIPs (for example, through land-use plans and stationary source 
regulations), one might argue that nonattainment problems reflect inadequate federal 
oversight of NAAQS compliance efforts.98 On the other hand, some characterize the new 
source review (NSR) program that requires permits for major stationary sources in 
                                               
95 See Stewart, Richard B., Michael Oppenheimer and Bryce Rudyk, ‘Building a More Effective Global 
Climate Regime through a Bottom-Up Approach’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries L. 273, 297–98. 
96 American Lung Ass’n, Report on State of the Air 2013, at 8, accessed 30 June 2015 at 
www.lung.org/assets/documents/publications/state-of-the-air/state-of-the-air-report-2013.pdf; Adelman, 
supra n.91, at 301. For a complete list of nonattainment areas for all criteria pollutants, see ‘Currently 
Designated Nonattainment Areas for All Criteria Pollutants’, EPA, accessed 30 June 2015 at 
www.epa.gov/oaqps001/greenbk/ancl.html.  
97 See Adelman, supra n.91, at § IV A–B. 
98 EPA and the states actually share regulatory authority over motor vehicles: EPA establishes federal tailpipe 
emission standards, but states can also significantly reduce such emissions through transportation planning 
efforts and other regulatory mechanisms.  
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nonattainment and PSD areas as unduly burdensome and needlessly intrusive on state 
prerogatives.99 
<em>Perhaps the most dysfunctional CAA provisions, however, are those restricting 
interstate air pollution. Before 1990, these restrictions accomplished little, as EPA and the 
courts consistently held that downwind states failed to prove that upwind sources 
significantly contributed to downwind state nonattainment.100 The 1990 amendments 
lessened the burden of proof for states soliciting EPA assistance in controlling upwind state 
sources contributing to downwind state nonattainment and allowed EPA to require upwind 
state regulation based on the aggregate contributions of groups of sources instead of having 
to trace problems to a single source.101 Judicial interpretation of the amended statute left 
EPA’s efforts to mitigate interstate pollution in a shambles, however. The DC Circuit 
invalidated major regulatory initiatives by the Bush and Obama administrations.102 The 
Supreme Court reversed the DC Circuit’s latest invalidation, upholding EPA’s Cross-State 
                                               
99 See e.g. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 502–18 (2004) (Kennedy J dissenting); 
Gaines, Sanford E., ‘Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development’ (2003)  10 Buff Envtl 
LJ 1, 9 (raising possibility that NSR is impeding, not promoting emissions reductions); Murkowski, Senator 
Frank H., ‘The Kyoto Protocol Is Not the Answer to Climate Change’ (2000) 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 345, 361–
62 (describing NSR as intrusive). Others have criticized NSR’s grandfathering of existing sources, which 
arguably creates perverse incentives not to modernize old plants or competitive advantages for such plants. 
See e.g. Nash, Jonathan Remy and Richard L. Revesz, ‘Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The 
Law and Economics of New Source Review’ (2007) 101 Nw U.L. Rev. 1677, 1709–11; Revesz, Richard L. 
and Allison L. Westfahl Kong, ‘Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition Relief (2011) 105 Nw U.L. Rev. 
1581, 1628–32. Professor Adelman recommends scrapping NSR, thereby removing constraints on state 
regulatory choices in nonattainment and PSD areas. At the same time, he suggests giving EPA increased 
power to work with states and localities to address transportation control and small source emissions, which 
collectively are more responsible for nonattainment than large industrial sources. See Adelman, supra n.91, 
at § IV A–B. 
100 See Glicksman, Robert L., ‘Watching the River Flow: The Prospects for Improved Interstate Water 
Pollution Control’ (1993) 43 J Urb & Contemp L 119, 166–68; Crider, Kay M. ‘Interstate Air Pollution: Over 
a Decade of Ineffective Regulation’ (1988) 64 Chi-Kent L. Re. 619. 
101 See Glicksman, supra n.100, at 566–67. 
102 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (DC Cir. 2012), rev’d & remanded, 134 S Ct 1584 
(2014); North Carolina v EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (DC Cir), modified on reh’g, 550 F.3d 1176 (DC Cir. 2008). 
  
 
26 
Air Pollution Rule.103 The Court’s decision did not resolve all issues concerning the Rule, 
however, and EPA’s efforts to implement it are likely to face significant delays, including 
the possibility of additional litigation.104 The irony is that Congress authorized federal 
control of interstate air pollution in 1963, before authorizing any other federal air quality-
related regulation. Fifty years later, the collective action problems arising from these 
transboundary externalities remain seemingly intractable. 
 
<A>A collective action-based response to climate change mitigation 
 
Climate change is the most significant problem facing environmental policymakers in the 
US and elsewhere. In the absence of a federal statute directed to controlling GHGs that 
contribute to climate change, EPA has addressed the problem under the CAA.105 Some 
contend that the CAA is ill suited to addressing climate change mitigation, a global problem 
with characteristics different from the localized air pollution problems targeted by the 
NAAQS program.106 Nevertheless, the CAA already addresses both regional (acid 
deposition) and global (stratospheric ozone depletion) transboundary problems, apparently 
                                               
103 EPA v EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S Ct 1584 (2014). 
104 See e.g. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4528137 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 
Ambrosio, Patrick, ‘Attorney Says “Live Issues” Remain Following Supreme Court Decision on Cross-State 
Rule’ (8 May 2014) 45 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 1467; Childers, Andrew, ‘Challenges Remain Despite Supreme 
Court Decision Reinstating EPA Cross-State Rule’ (29 April 2014) BNA Env’t Rep.,  accessed 30 June 2015 
at www.bna.com/challenges-remain-despite-n17179890025/.  
105 See Massachusetts v EPA, 549 US 497 (2007) (holding that emissions of GHGs such as carbon dioxide 
are pollutants for CAA purposes, authorizing EPA to regulate them from mobile sources under § 202 of the 
Act); Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the 
Clean Air Act; CAA rulemakings, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (15 December 2009). 
106 Cf. ibid. at 559 (Scalia J. dissenting) (insisting that regulation of GHGs ‘is not akin to regulating the 
concentration of some substance that is polluting the air’). 
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quite effectively. The question is whether the CAA’s version of cooperative federalism, in 
which the federal government solicits state assistance but ultimately retains control, is a 
good fit for climate change mitigation. 
<em>Some environmental law experts, including Holly Doremus, have endorsed a 
cooperative federalism-based approach to climate change mitigation.107 Such an effort 
could entail direct federal technology-based regulation of mobile and new stationary source 
emissions, supplemented by state and local planning and implementation roles. As noted 
below, this is the approach that EPA has undertaken thus far, by establishing technology-
based performance standards for motor vehicles and fossil fuel-fired power plants. 
Although there is not much state discretion in the implementation of the standards for 
motor vehicles and new power plants, EPA has issued a rule for existing power plants that 
allow states to experiment with a variety of implementation approaches—however, EPA 
retains final authority to review the adequacy of state implementation plans and issue a 
federal implementation plan if necessary. 
A cooperative federalism approach to GHG regulation can be justified by collective 
action concerns.108 The presence of transboundary externalities, for example, justifies 
nationally (and internationally) led efforts to control GHGs. These externalities do not 
support preemption of more stringent state regulation, however, because such regulation 
will benefit all jurisdictions, not just the adopting state. As a result, California should retain 
                                               
107 Doremus, Holly and W. Michael Haneman, ‘Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act’s 
Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming’ (2008) 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 799. 
But cf. Schapiro, Robert A., ‘Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism’ (2009) 3 Harv L & 
Pol’y Rev. 34, 42 (‘It is clear that the national government must be part of any solution. . . . No one believes 
that global warming is best addressed by the states rather than the national government.’). 
108 See generally Glicksman and Levy, supra n.46, at 610–47. 
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its authority to adopt more stringent tailpipe emission standards and low carbon fuel 
standards.109  
<em>Retained state authority risks non-uniform regulation in the form of multiple state 
standards, but no more so than does the CAA’s current preemption waiver. California has 
already demonstrated its leadership in controlling GHG emissions from mobile sources.110 
Moreover, the uniformity rationale for exclusive federal regulation of new motor vehicle 
emissions does not apply to stationary source regulation, and does not justify preemption 
of more stringent state controls. Race-to-the-bottom concerns justify a federal floor on 
stationary source emissions to preclude states from competing for business by adopting 
weak GHG emission controls, but they do not justify preemption of more stringent state 
controls. 
<em>Superior resources suggest a significant federal role in developing climate change 
scientific information and at least a backup role in enforcement of mandatory state 
requirements. A closer question might be whether state regulation would undermine the 
international bargaining position of the US in extracting commitments from reluctant 
foreign nations, but at least two federal courts have rejected that rationale as a reason to 
preempt state GHG emission controls.111 Finally, the design of a climate change regime 
                                               
109 For some examples of recent state policies to address GHG emissions, see Klass, Alexandra B. and 
Elizabeth Henley, ‘Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (2013–2014) 5 
San Diego J of Climate & Energy L. 127. Such efforts may be vulnerable to challenges alleging 
unconstitutional extraterritorial application, however. See e.g. North Dakota v Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891 
(D Minn. 2014) (invalidating Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act, which established energy and 
environmental standards relating to carbon dioxide emissions). 
110 See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v Crombie, 508 F Supp 2d 295, 394 (D Vt 2007). 
111 Ibid.; Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v Goldstene, 529 F Supp 2d 1151 (ED Cal. 2007), reconsideration 
denied, 563 F Supp 2d 1158 (ED Cal. 2008). 
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need not dwell on the NIMBY phenomenon because GHG emissions in one state generally 
have the same effects on climate change as emissions in any other place. Efforts to exclude 
a GHG-emitting source will therefore not benefit a state if its stringent regulations prompt 
a source to operate elsewhere. Indeed, the more salient problem may be the reverse in that 
a state that regards itself as at low risk from climate change (such as a landlocked state that 
need not fear sea level rise or coastal flooding) may be more inclined than a more 
vulnerable state to allow high levels of GHG emissions. 
<em>EPA has sought to achieve a balance between federal leadership and state autonomy 
in its regulation of GHGs under the CAA. In addition to developing federal performance 
standards for CO2 emissions from motor vehicles and some stationary sources,112 EPA 
issued technology-based emission guidelines in 2015 under § 111(d) for state regulation of 
CO2 emissions from existing electric generating units.113 The guidelines aim to reduce CO2 
emissions from the power sector by approximately 32 percent from 2005 levels by 2030. 
To achieve this goal, EPA has created a ‘partnership between the EPA and the states’ under 
which EPA will establish state-specific emission rate-based CO2 goals for the power sector 
and states will ‘take the lead’ on meeting those goals by creating plans that are consistent 
                                               
112 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty 
Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (15 September 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 523, 534, 535, 
and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 534, 535); 2017 and Later Model year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (15 October 2012) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537); Standards of Performance 
for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units (3 August 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98),  
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule.pdf; Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector: Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources (18 August 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60). 
113 Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 
(3 August 2015) (to be codified at 40 CFR pt 60, subpart UUUU), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/cpp/cps-
final-rule.pdf). 
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with EPA guidelines.114 According to EPA, the guidelines are ‘based on, and reinforce, the 
actions already being taken by states and utilities’ to upgrade existing electricity 
infrastructure.115 The regulatory approach also 
 
<quotation>provides flexibility for states to build upon their progress, and the 
progress of cities and towns, in addressing GHGs, and minimizes additional 
requirements for existing programs where possible. It also allows states to pursue 
policies to reduce carbon pollution that: 1) continue to rely on a diverse set of 
energy resources; 2) ensure electric system reliability; 3) provide affordable 
electricity; 4) recognize investments that states and power companies are already 
making; and 5) tailor plans to meet their respective energy, environmental and 
economic needs and goals, and those of their local communities.116</quotation> 
 
Like the state implementation plan process that governs achievement of the NAAQS,117 
EPA’s § 111(d) rule relies heavily on a cooperative federalism partnership: EPA 
establishes quantitative pollution reduction targets, states are afforded flexibility in 
deciding how they wish to achieve the federally specified targets, and states remain 
                                               
114 Ibid. at 23-24. Although EPA will be responsible for setting the CO2 reduction goals, EPA has crafted 
these goals based on the unique position of each state, taking into account pre-existing state programs and 
policies such as state-wide regional cap-and-trade programs and renewable portfolio standards. See Section 
V (‘The Best System of Emission Reduction and Associated Building Blocks’) ‘of the Final Rule for a 
detailed description of how EPA intends to establish state-specific CO2 emission reduction goals for the 
power sector. Ibid. at 282. 
115 Ibid. at 90. 
116 Ibid. at 90. 
117 Nevertheless, EPA has identified distinctions between the SIP and § 111(d) processes. Ibid. at 34,834. 
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accountable through EPA review of state plans and their implementation. The § 111(d) rule 
is noteworthy not only as an ambitious effort to use the CAA to reduce GHG emissions 
that contribute to climate change, but also as a program that recognizes and accommodates 
the need for states to craft policies and program suited to their own needs and the capacities 
of affected stakeholders. Notwithstanding this accommodation, and consistent with the 
cooperative federalism model threaded throughout the CAA, the federal government 
retains the final say over pollution reduction goals and the capacity to step in if states fail 
to abide by their responsibilities.  
 
<A>Conclusion 
 
The CAA initiated cooperative federalism in US environmental law. Its design should be 
well understood, along with the strengths and weaknesses of its federalism model in 
combatting air pollution. Fundamental misconceptions nevertheless persist about why 
Congress relied on both federal and state governments to control air pollution. Despite 
judicial characterizations that the CAA created an equal partnership between EPA and the 
states, it was never intended to do so. EPA has always been in charge, notwithstanding 
delegation of discretion to the states to determine how best to fashion an emission control 
strategy capable of achieving the NAAQS set by EPA to meet federally determined air 
quality goals. Even in that realm, EPA’s authority increased and state prerogatives 
narrowed as states failed to satisfy NAAQS deadlines. The statute was not principally an 
effort to protect states’ rights, notwithstanding traditional state police power authority to 
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address public health risks. Congress repeatedly chose to protect state authority to regulate 
more rigorously than the federal government, not the authority to reach divergent 
judgments about the appropriate balance between promoting economic activity and 
protecting human health. 
<em>An accurate understanding of the nature of cooperative federalism under the CAA is 
critical. It is difficult for policymakers to fix problems and for judges to review 
implementation of the statute if they do not appreciate how the statute was meant to work. 
Similarly, efforts to adapt the CAA to meet climate change challenges by increasing or 
decreasing the federal or state role for particular tasks are more likely to succeed if they 
are based on a proper understanding of the existing statutory foundation. 
